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3See generally Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows of the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. Car. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961) . Cf. W. SCHAEPR, THE SuspzcT AN SocirEY (1966) . information provided by sources whose character and motives dictate a valid judicial concern for an informant's reliability. However, in light of this concern, the courts may well have overreacted by developing an inflexible rule structure for the quantum of information about the informant's reliability that should be contained in an application for a search warrant. As a surface matter, the rigidity of existing rules would seem to require that all information provided the police be tested by the same reliability standards. But it is anomalous that similar reliability considerations should exist when a warrant is sought on the basis of information provided by a citizen who is the victim of, or witness to, a crime, as when, for example, the classic "stool pigeon" provides information. To the extent that law enforcement officers must meticulously demonstrate the reliability of the citizen informant and the "stool pigeon" in the same technical way, time and effort are needlessly expended and, where technical requirements are not met, reliable evidence is needlessly excluded. This article will focus on a concept in the embryonic stages of development-the citizen informant doctrine-which has been accepted in varying degrees in some jurisdictions and represents a solution to the problem suggested above. Briefly stated, this doctrine permits the issuance of a search warrant on the basis of information supplied by an ordinary citizen who observes the commission of a crime without regard to particularized considerations of reliability. Before attempting to articulate and crystallize the doctrine, it is necessary to place it in the historical context of the fourth amendemnt cases.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in fourth amendment cases "point in differing directions and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will make them all perfectly consistent." 4 However, the Court has consistently emphasized that, wherever possible, searches should be conducted pursuant to a warrant so that a neutral and detached judicial officer is interposed between the officer and his suspect. 5 In addition to its preference for the use of search warrants, the Court has attempted to insure that the magistrate's function is more than that of a "rubber stamp" for the law enforcement officer. 6 The issuing officer is compelled to make an independent evaluation of the reliability of the facts put forth by the complaining officer. Under no circumstances can he rely upon "a mere affirmation of suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate supporting facts."
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The function of the magistrate became more delicate with the abolition of the requirement, imposed by some courts, 8 that the complaining officer possess personal knowledge of facts amounting to a criminal offense. The demise of that doctrine with respect to warrantless arrests 9 opened the way for - See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-51 (1971) 502-03 (1965) :
The assumption apparently is that greater protection for the individual is afforded by the warrant procedure, since an arrest will be made only if an impartial judicial officer, upon careful evaluation of the evidence presented to him, determines that adequate grounds for an arrest exist. But, at least in [some states] it is clear that the warrant process does not serve this function. Rather, the decision is made in the office of the prosecutor and the judge routinely signs the arrest warrant without any independent inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
See also Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964
WAsir. U.L.Q. 1, 17.
7 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933) . The standards used to test for probable cause are the same whether a search warrant, as in Nathanson, or an arrest warrant is being sought. See, e.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485 (1958); United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 n.2 (7th Cir. 1967 the Court to hold that warrants could issue upon hearsay information, 0 which, in turn, created the need for criteria by which a magistrate could test the reliability of the hearsay information. Thus arose the Court's controversial decision in Aguilar V. Texas." In Aguilar two Houston police officers applied for a warrant to search a home for narcotics on the basis of "reliable information from a credible person." Finding the exposition far too conclusory to warrant a magistrate's finding of probable cause, Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion articulated the now famous two-pronged test to be used by magistrates in assessing the sufficiency of information intended to produce a warrant. As a constitutional yardstick for evaluating hearsay in a warrant application, the magistrate, said the Court, had to be informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances relied upon by the person providing the affiant with information and (2) some of the circumstances indicating that the person supplying the information to the affiant was credible or his information reliable.
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After observing the reaction to its decision in Aguilar, 3 the Court, counseled by experience, accepted review of the Eighth Circuit's divided en banc determination in United States v. Spinelli.
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The affadavit in question asserted that the F.B.I. had observed Spinelli going to an apartment containing two telephones and that an informer had said that Spinelli was conducting a gambling operation using two telephones with certain numbers, which matched the numbers of the phones in the apartment Spinelli had visited. R1v. 840 (1965) . '4382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967 ) (en banc). Mr. Justice Blackmun, a member of the Eighth Circuit majority which upheld the warrant in Spinelli, remains firm in his belief that the circuit court's opinion was correct and that the Supreme Court erred in reversing. See Harris v. United States, 403 U. S. 573, 585-86 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Rather than clarify the law in this area, the Court's splintered decision in Spinelli only served to complicate and confuse the situation. While it is difficult to extract any clearly focused principles of law from the opinion, the decision, on its facts, seemed to elevate the evidentiary standards necessary to satisfy Aguilar's dual criteria. The plurality opinion found the detail set forth in the affidavit, even though partially corroborated, insufficient under Aguilar because the information disclosed no more than a series of innocent acts coupled with a naked conclusion of criminal activity. However, since Draper v. United States 6 had previously upheld a warrantless arrest based upon an informant's tip which, while disclosing nothing particularly sinister, was so detailed as to be self-verifying, the Court went to great lengths to distinguish Draper in terms of the amount of detail provided by the informant. Consequently, the evidentiary detail which, pursuant to Spineli, must be provided the magistrate before he could constitutionally discharge his function, according to Mr. Justice Black, "expands Aguilar to almost unbelievable proportions.' The antimony presented by the self-verifying information notions of Draper and the elaborate specificity required under Spineli's evidentiary expansion of the Aguilar doctrine made it "perhaps not the easiest task for a lower court to walk the logical tightrope of Draper- In this context of judicial confusion, an individual named Roosevelt Harris was convicted for possessing non-taxpaid liquor. The verdict was primarily secured by evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and, therefore, his appeal to the Sixth Circuit concerned only the sufficiency of the affadavit upon which the warrant was predicated. In a per curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit, relying on the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis, reversed the conviction. 9 That court found that the first prong of Aguilar was satisfied because the hearsay declarant visually observed the facts asserted 0 However, the second requirement of Aguilar-a basis for confirming the out-of-court declarant's credibility-was held to be lacking. The issue came to the Supreme Court in this posture.
With Chief Justice Burger writing the plurality opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit" and indicated a willingness to take into account the totality of the circumstances under which the warrant was issued. 22 Mr. Justice Harlan's statement in Spineli that "the 'totality of the circumstances' approach.., paints with too broad a brush," 393 U.S. at 415, was, thereby, implicitly rejected.
U.S. 257, 271-72 (1960):
We conclude therefore that hearsay may be the basis for a warrant. We cannot say that there was so little basis for accepting the hearsay here that the Commissioner acted improperly. The Commissioner need not have been convinced of the presence of narcotics in the apartment. He might have found the affidavit insufficient and withheld his warrant. But there was substantial basis for him to conclude that narcotics were probably present in the apartment, and that is sufficient.
We have decided that, as hearsay alone does not render an affidavit insufficient, the Commissioner need not have required the informants or their affidavits to be produced ... so long as there was a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. coupled with the corroborating information, provides a "substantial basis" upon which to determine the existence of probable cause.
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While some commentators have interpreted Harris' "substantial basis" approach to have undermined the mechanical tests of Aguilar or, at least, to have obfuscated the line between its prongs, 25 it is doubtful that the Court went so far. Rather, since there was no dispute that the detailed personal observation provided by the Harris informant was sufficient to satisfy the first A guilar test, 26 the issue was reduced to the quantum of information necessary to establish the informant's credibility. Although Aguilar was not abandoned, the Court apparently reduced the burden for satisfying the second prong of the test to a standard less exacting than that envisioned by Spinelli. The Chief Justice, relying heavily upon a number of preSpinelli decisions, suggested a more flexible approach to examining probable cause affidavits which would avoid "hypertechnicality" and rely upon "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."n7
Because the affadavit held valid in Harris would probably have been rejected under a literal reading of Spinelli28 it is not unreasonable to assume that the thrust of Harris was to relax the elaborate specificity required by Spinelli to satisfy the second prong of the Aguilar test. One court has clearly stated that "while adhering in general to the Aguilar decision, the Supreme Court clearly indicated the burden for satisfying the so-called second prong of Aguilar was not as stringent as ' have given credence to the teachings of Harris insofar as it concerns the quantum of information necessary to satisfy the reliability of the informant prong of Aguilar.n While Harris concededly did not depart from the long line of cases voiding warrants procured on the basis of mere suspicions,n it did signal an abandonment of the rigidity of technical nicety in the review of affadavits for warrants. Therefore, contemporary warrant applications must be tested upon preSpinelli common sense considerations of practical accuracy. Concluding the Harris opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that "tilt will not do to say that warrants may not issue on uncorroborated hearsay. This only avoids the issues of whether there is reason for crediting the out-of-court statement.
' ' u By holding that reason for crediting the hearsay statements of informers could exist without the elaborate specificity deemed necessary under Spinelli, the Harris decision paved the road toward total acceptance of the innovative citizen-informant concept that has been discussed and applied in some jurisdictions, but never fully articulated and accepted on a national scale.
At the outset, it must be recognized that the question of whether citizen informants must be shown to be reliable in the same way and to the same extent as a police informant is of more than academic significance. One of the prime methods used to demonstrate reliability of an informant is to show that the informant has furnished accurate Avendo, 447 F.2d 575, 579 n.18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 985 (1971 information in the past. However, the citizen informant usually would not have more than one opportunity to supply information to the police, thereby precluding proof of his reliability by pointing to previous accurate information which he has supplied.n Thus, if the same rules which apply to proving the reliability of police informants apply to citizen informants, the affiant is faced with the difficult task of demonstrating reliability in other ways.
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The citizen-informant doctrine, which would avoid this anomaly, is predicated upon the fact that very different credibility considerations exist when warrants are issued upon information supplied by an ordinary citizen as opposed to an anonymous police informant. Police informants, for the most part, receive something in exchange for the information they supply, be it money or favorable consideration in connection with a charge pending against them. Since the police informant's information is self-serving, it must be considered suspect; and, therefore, before a search warrant can be issued upon such information, the judicial officer must be advised of some of the underlying reasons from which the affiant concluded that the informant was reliable. However, where an ordinary citizen supplies the information, there is no reason, for deeming the information self-serving or suspect and, therefore, a substantial basis for crediting the out-of-court statement exists by the mere fact that the information is furnished by a citizen.
This distinction was clearly articulated by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v. Paszek. [Ain ordinary citizen who reports a crime which has been committed in his presence, or that a crime is being or will be commited, stands on much different ground than a police informer. He is a witness to criminal activity who acts with an intent to aid the police in law enforcement because of his concern for society or for his own safety. He does not expect any gain or concession in exchange for his information. In Hoffman an unidentified citizen told police officers that she had seen a man with a vulgarism written on his forehead go into a restaurant. The policemen went into the restaurant and were met with resistance in attempting to make an arrest. On appeal from a conviction for resisting arrest, defendant's contention that no probable cause existed to arrest him was rejected. The police officers were justified in relying on the information received from the woman because the standard "requirement of prior reliability which must be met when police act upon 'tips' from professional informers does not apply to information supplied by ordinary citizens." 4 Perhaps the best rationale for considering citizen-eyewitness information to be inherently reliable can be derived from the law of evidence. The hearsay rule requires certain evidence to be excluded at trial because it is thought to be unreliable; but, by the same token, numerous exceptions to the rule have been developed because certain kinds of hearsay evidence are inherently reliable.a4 Citizen-eyewitness information generally takes a form similar to declarations that fall within certain exceptions to the hearsay rule and should, therefore, be accorded the same respect in terms of reliability. Moreover, since it is axiomatic that probable cause can be predicated upon evidence that would not necessarily be admissible at trial,4' it seems clear that extra-"845111l 2d 221, 258 N.E.2d. 326 (1970). "9 Whether a citizen informer is automatically deemed to satisfy the reliability prong of Aguilar or to render the prong inapplicable is a distinction without a substantive difference. While the former supports strict adherence to the mechanical tests of Aguilar, the latter seems less fictive. The Chief Justice employed this rationale in Harris to reach the conclusion that admissions against penal interest, although perhaps not sufficiently reliable to constitute evidenceat trial,"carry their own indicia of credibility-sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search."3 Since statements in the form of marginal hearsay exceptions are sufficient to generate probable cause, the reliability of information supplied to police can be determined, as an analytical matter, by resort to the rules of evidence. As the Chief Justice emphasized in Harris, the statements need not fall directly within a hearsay exception so as to be competent trial evidence; but a statement that carries its own "indicia of credibility" will suffice.
A recognized exception to the hearsay rule exists where a statement is uttered under the stress of an exciting event which suspends the powers of reflection and fabrication and, thereby, renders the statement reliable." Three basic requirements must be fulfilled, under Professor Wigmore's analysis, before the "spontaneous exclamation" or, as sometimes termed, "excited utterance" hearsay exception becomes viable: (1) a startling event must occur which shocks the declarant into a state of nervous excitement and causes him to (2) make a statement while under the stress of the event which (3) relates to the circumstances of the event. While most information supplied to the police by ordinary citizens falls within this strict definition, a more precise study of the spontaneous exclamation exception reveals that the doctrine is not so stringent as the requirements appear. that a broad range of information provided police officers comes within the perimeters of the analogy.
The initial requirement under the excited utterance exception requires the perception of an event which "might so excite and control the mind of the speaker that his statements are natural and spontaneous and therefore, sincere and trustworthy"." Neither Wig-more nor the case law limits the kind of act or event capable of causing excitement to a particularized situation. Since a variety of events which would be considered nonstartling in contrast to the observation of a crime in progress have been found sufficient to trigger the exception,4 it is unnecessary for present purposes to review the amorphous mass of case law involving events which the courts considered startling.
The second element necessary to satisfy the excited utterance exception involves the time of the declaration. "The utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent."4 However, it is clear that the statements "need not be strictly contemporaneous with the existing cause; they may be subsequent to it, provided that there has not been time for the exciting influence to lose its sway and be dissipated.
' 49 While the cases on the permissible time lag between the event and the declaration are disparate," it is clear that "there can beno definite and fixed limit of time .... Thus, the application of the principle thus depends entirely on the circumstances of each case".
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Finally, Wigmore required the declaration to relate to the circumstances of the occurrence causing it in order to be admissible as an excited utterance. Although some cases have written this requirement away in the ordinary hearsay exception situa- [Vol. 64 tion," it would be an essentiality in considering the reliability of information supplied by a citizen. Since the event that raises the excitement should be the subject of the ensuing warrant application, it is necessary that the statement of the citizen to police officials directly relate to what he observed. But, it should be noted that the spontaneous exclamation exception has been applied to statements made in response to interrogation where the sway of the exciting event has not dissipated." Thus, the reliability of information given in response to police investigative work occurring immediately after a crime has been committed should likewise be considered reliable for warrant purposes if, in response to a question, a citizen-eyewitness provides information relating to the offense under investigation.
Of course, it is difficult to compare the essential features of a given hearsay exception to a citizeninformant situation without assessing the particular facts and circumstances under which the citizen supplies information to the police. However, as a theoretical matter, the analogy appears sound. Moreover, as the law of evidence with respect to the admissibility of hearsay at trial becomes increasingly liberalized--apparently reflecting a consensus that more kinds of hearsay evidence are reliable--it does not seem unreasonable to broaden the scope of information that will constitutionally authorize the issuance of a warrant. Consistent with the theory underlying exceptions to the hear- UFD. R. Ev., 804(b) (2) (1971 Revised Draft) exempts from the operation of the hearsay rule any statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollection was dear. This rule represents a crystallization and extension of the efforts of Wigmore and Morgan to create an orderly analytic basis upon which to apply the chaotic--and now outmoded--concept of res gestae. Since the predetermined reliability of evidence of this nature saves it from a confrontation clause violation, cf. Duton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), information provided the police, falling within the contours of the rule, should certainly pass the reliability test of Aguilar in the probable cause setting. However, by its own terms, it would not apply to information elicited by police questioning. say rule, information given to the police by those who observe the commission of a crime, whether victim or bystander, should be deemed sufficient to generate probable cause to arrest and search. The credence given such information rests in part upon the common sense notion that a responsible citizen, as opposed to a paid informant, will not disregard the consequences of supplying inaccurate information to police.5
While the citizen-informant doctrine has not been widely adopted, there appear to be no overwhelming barriers to its judicial acceptance. Although the cases do not generally articulate the foregoing rationale, they do uniformly conclude that, in situations involving on-the-scene apprehension of suspects, information supplied by citizenobservers is sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause. For example, in Chambers v. Maroneyfe a gas station attendant gave the police a description of the men who robbed him and two teenagers identified an auto that they had seen speeding away from a parking lot near the scene of the crime. The Supreme Court concluded that "[h]aving talked to the teenage observers and to the victim" the police had "ample cause" to stop the auto and arrest its occupants.7 Chambers' probable cause pronouncement was followed in United States v. Trotter,ss where a bartender who had cashed what he believed to be a counterfeit bill alerted the police and described the auto in which the defendants were riding. The ensuing arrest and search were found proper.
This line of cases is best exemplified by Chief Justice Burger's opinion, when Circuit Judge, in Brown v. United States. There, the police received information from an unknown victim of a crime which was radioed to other officers who, thereafter, apprehended the defendant. To the defendant's claim that the information was insufficient to establish probable cause, the Chief Justice forcefully responded:
Although the police could not here judge the reliability of the information on the basis of past experience with the informant, the victim's report has the virtue of being based on personal observation ... and is less likely to be colored by selfinterest than is that of an informant. Admittedly a crime victim's observation may be faulty in some respects, as it may have been here; however, the mistakes are irrelevant if there is sufficient particularized information to constitute probable cause. Except in those few cases where cameras are part of a burglar alarm system, most reports are likely to be less than perfect.6
Although the courts have not grounded their decisions upon reliability of information expressed in terms of hearsay exceptions such as spontaneous exclamations, it is clear from the foregoing examples that information supplied by a citizen-eyewitness is entitled to great weight in determining probable cause. 6 ' An ever-increasing number of jurisdictions have therefore cast aside the customary analytical tools for determining probable cause and have squarely embraced the citizen-informant concept. In these jurisdictions, the reliability of the individual supplying information to the police need not be buttressed by supporting facts where it appears that he is a citizen outside the criminal environment.
The leading case on the subject appears to be Peoplc v. Lewis, 62 where a Mr. Owens witnessed a burglary and identified a man on the street nearby as the perpetrator of the offense. Holding the arrest andl search of the person so identified to be proper, the California Court of Appeals reasoned that the only alternatives available to the police officer at the moment were to place credence in the citizen's information or allow the suspect to flee. Since the latter alternative was highly undesirable if any credence could be given to the citizen's information, the court analyzed the various differences between "stool pigeons" and citizens in terms of measuring the reliability of their information. It concluded by upholding the arrest and search on the ground that the tests of reliability which must be applied to ordinary police informants "are not necessarily ap- Since Lewis, the California courts have articulated the citizen-informant concept as black letter law: "A citizen who purports to be a victim of or to have witnessed a crime is a reliable informant even though his reliability has not theretofore been proved or tested.6 A great number of other jurisdictions have followed California's lead in holding that information supplied by a citizen is automatically reliable. These cases are generally predicated upon the ground that a citizen who supplies such information has nothing to gain-and perhaps something to lose-by so acting, that his personal observations can be trusted because of the absence of a motive to falsify, that ordinary citizens generally have no previous transactions with the police disclosing prior reliability, and that activity in the aid of law enforcement should be encouraged. Consequently, where an ordinary citizen offers information about criminal activity, a warrant may issue or an arrest ensue without a factual basis for deeming the informant reliable. 65 The federal courts, while recognizing the states' increasing acceptance of the citizen-informant doctrine 6 6 have proceeded somewhat differently. formant with respect to credibility questions upon which a magistrate issuing a warrant must pass. The court recognized that the rationale behind the reliability of the informant prong of Aguilar was to insure that search warrants are not issued on the basis of idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture which, passing through the criminal community, is seized upon by an informant to ingratiate himself to the police. But, because eyewitnesses by definition are not passing along idle rumor, since they either have been the victims of the crime or have otherwise seen some portion of it, the rationale behind the reliability requirement of Aguilar has no application. "A 'neutral and detached magistrate' could adequately assess the probative value of an eye-witness's information because, if it is reasonable and accepted as true, the magistrate must believe that it is based upon first-hand knowledge."61 If any rule of general applicability can be discerned from the federal cases, it is not that a citizen who supplies information is automatically reliable regardless of the qualitative value of the information he supplies, but rather that, where the information provided appears reasonably true, "lain informant who alleges he is an 'eye-witness' to an actual crime perpetrated demonstrates sufficient 'reliability' of the person."
6 None of the above should be taken to suggest that there are no dangers involved in complete, blind acceptance of the citizen-informant doctrine. Courts must be on guard to protect the fourth amendment rights of individuals against one who would, under the guise of being a responsible citizen who had witnessed a crime, supply false information to the police to fulfill a personal vendetta. To protect against fourth amendment infringements resulting from such purposefully false information, the details supplied by the asserted responsible citizen should be, to a certain extent, so complete as to be self-verifying. This is not to say that the information should be sufficient to generate selfverification under Spinelli's assessment of Draper, 70 6 8 Id. at 1238-39. 69 McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264 , 1269 (8th Cir. 1969 for such a demand would, by definition, render reliability considerations unnecessary. However, the fact that information is offered by an ordinary citizen, coupled with a tender of information in sufficient detail so as to reasonably avoid the appearance of fabrication, is enough to create probable cause. "In sum, the internal content of the affidavit intriniscally proves the truth of the 'responsible' citizen's word."" A suitable benchmark for determining the circumstances in which the citizen's word should be taken as true is found in United States v. Unger.
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The defendant was found guilty of possessing unregistered firearms which were seized pursuant to a warrant obtained by the Chicago policeY 3 The warrant application stated that an unnamed citizen, while working in the basement of an apartment building, had occasion to observe a cache of weapons through an opening in an enclosed locker. Because of his military experience, he was able to identify the weapons for the police. He also pointed out the building in question for the police and drew a diagram of the basement location of the locker.
Upholding the trial judge's denial of a motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit analyzed the impact of Harris upon the law governing search warrants and concluded by finding that, in the context of a citizen-informant situation, the information in the complaint was sufficiently self-verifying to attest to the citizen's reliability. Judge Duffy's opinion announced that, although a police officer's opinion of the reliability of a citizen-informant was alone insufficient to show probable cause, when coupled with information in a complaint which attested to its own integrity by the specificity with which it was stated and some degree of corroboration, a warrant could properly issue. 73 As often occurs in cases of this nature, Unger evolved from an investigation conducted by local police who, upon discovering a federal violation, referred their findings to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Because referrals of this nature generally take place after the contraband is seized, the federal government is unable to supervise the warrant procedure and must take the warrant as it finds it. 74 469 F.2d at 1287. That some degree of corroboration is necessary for a citizen's tip to generate probable cause, even in the jurisdiction in which the citizen-in-While courts should demand an acceptable level of detail in the information supplied, there are several other factors effectuating the design of the fourth amendment in the citizen-informant context. These factors are manifested in a number of considerations militating against the knowing transmission of false information to the police. Because a citizen who supplies false information about a crime subjects himself to potential criminal and civil penalties, a variety of sanctions exists to deter a vindictive tender of misinformation.
False information given to a federal agent for purposes of initiating a criminal investigation may subject the supplier to criminal prosecutionY 5 Moreover, some states, by a number of differently labeled statutes, make the false report of criminal activity punishable as a misdemeanory 6 Therefore, criminal penalties await one who would purposefully give false information of illegal conduct. Similarly, a tender of false information may subject the supplier to pecuniary liability. While false information given to police officers may be insufficient to support a civil cause of action for false formant doctrine was founded, is made apparent by People v. Zimnicki, 29 Cal. App. 3d 577, 105 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1972) .
75 There is a conflict in the circuits as to whether supplying false information to the F.B.I. is cognizable under the federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. §1001 (1970) 363 (8th Cir. 1967) . Significantly, both courts were particularly concerned with whether the prosecution of false information of this nature would inhibit citizens from supplying information to the police and, thereby, stultify the desirable resulting effects. Different conclusions on this subject were in no small part responsible for the conflicting results. But see Note, 5 HouSTON L. REv. 548, 553 (1968) 7 1 E.g., IL. REV. STAT, Ch. 38, §26-1 (1972) , provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:
(5) Transmits in any manner to any peace officer, public officer or public employee a report to the effect that an offense has been committed, knowing at the time of such transmission that there is no reasonable ground for believing that such an offense has been committed. See also Azsz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §13-962 (1956) imprisonment if the ensuing arrest based on the information proves improper, it may create a litigious issue under state law.7 Thus, the expense of potential litigation, like possible criminal punishment, stands as a deterrent to false reports of crime.
In light of the inherent reliability of citizen information and the safeguards against its abuse, sound policy reasons dictate total acceptance of the citizen-informant doctrine. The interest that the fourth amendment is designed to protect is, according to Justice Cardozo, "the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office." 7 8 Permitting a police officer to act upon information supplied by a responsible citizen, whether victim or bystander, will surely not result in his flouting the law by the insolence of office. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the "obligation of all citizens to aid in enforcing the criminal laws." 7 9 And Mr. Justice White has warned that "[n]either the ordinary citizen nor the confessed criminal should be discouraged from reporting what he knows to the authorities and from lending his aid to secure evidence of crime." ' 0 In this regard, courts have countenanced and encouraged the use of paid informants and undercover agents since time immemorial." The responsible citizen who presents the police with evidence of a crime should be no less encouraged, for "it is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals."8 Unfortunately, contemporary disillusionment rides rampant over the apathy of the citizenry toward becoming "involved" by reporting a crime to the police. If law enforcement officials are unnecessarily prevented from effectively responding to the pleas of citizens, apathy will grow and the duty of the citizen to aid in law enforcement will remain a paper obligation. Therefore, it is time to lay to rest any misconception concerning the reliability of an eyewitness to, or victim of, a crime for purposes of generating probable cause to search. This would not make the term "citizen" a magic word to be mechanically inserted in all warrant applications, but would insure judicial cognizance of practical considerations and modem realities in the administration of criminal justice.
